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Abstract  
We use lifetime job histories from the pension records to evaluate changes in job 
stability in Finland between 1963 and 2004. We specify a duration model and 
estimate the effects of elapsed duration, age, and calendar time on the hazard of 
job ending using individual-level panel data spanning over four decades. We find 
that this hazard increased during the recession years in the early 1990s but has 
now returned to the level that prevailed in the 1970s. We also demonstrate that 
the fluctuations in the hazard rate together with the changes in labor market entry 
rates have complicated dynamic effects on the tenure distribution, and that 
analysing the changes in job stability based on the elapsed duration of ongoing 
jobs may be quite misleading.  
Key words: job stability, duration models  
JEL classification numbers: J62, J63 
 
Tiivistelmä  
Tutkimuksessa arvioidaan työsuhteiden keston muutoksia vuosien 1963 ja 2004 
välillä eläkerekisterien tietojen avulla. Estimoimme 42 vuoden pituisesta yksilö-
tason paneeliaineistosta duraatiomallin, jossa työsuhteen päättymisen ja 
työpaikan vaihdon riskiä selitetään työsuhteen siihenastisella kestolla, työnteki-
jän iällä ja kalenterivuodella. Tulosten mukaan työpaikan päättymisriski kasvoi 
1990-luvun laman aikana, mutta on sen jälkeen palannut 1970-luvun tasolle. 
Osoitamme myös, että työpaikan päättymisriskin muutokset ja muutoksen uusien 
työpaikkojen syntymisvauhdissa aikaansaavat monimutkaisia dynaamisia vaiku-
tuksia työsuhteitten kestojakaumaan ja että siksi työsuhteiden vakauden arviointi 
työsuhteiden keston muutosten avulla voi olla harhaanjohtavaa. 
Avainsanat: työsuhteiden kesto, duraatiomalli 
JEL-luokittelu: J62, J63  
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1. Introduction 
There is now a relatively large literature on the changes in job stability and on the 
incidence of lifetime jobs in the economy. A general conclusion from the existing 
studies is that changes in job stability were small up to the mid 1990s (e.g. 
Neumark 2000, Burgess & Rees 1996), but during the more recent years job 
stability has declined (e.g. Farber 2007, Gregg & Wadsworth 2002). While the 
majority of existing studies are based on the US data, there are also several 
studies describing the trends in job durations in European countries. A cross-
country study by OECD (2007) is probably the most recent source of 
comparative data across countries. We use data from Finland that could be 
considered as a typical European country in terms of job stability. According to 
the Eurostat Labor Force survey, job stability, measured by the average job 
tenure, was 9.9 years in Finland in 2005 which was only slightly higher than the 
unweighted EU average of 9.7 years.  
A common problem in most existing studies of job stability is that genuine panel 
data where job spells could be followed over their entire span is generally 
lacking. This prevents modelling job durations using standard methods of 
survival analysis. Instead, researchers have examined the changes in the 
distribution of elapsed duration of ongoing jobs or used strategies based on 
inferring job durations from retention rates calculated from short panels or 
synthetic cohort data. In many ways available data on job durations resembles 
data that was available for research on unemployment duration in the 1980s.  
In this paper we use administrative data from the Finnish pension insurance 
companies. These data cover a time period starting from 1963, the year following 
the creation of the current earnings related pension system in 1962, up to the 
recent pension reform in the end of 2004. We have access to a representative 
sample of fifteen cohorts of Finns who were employed in the private sector at 
some point during this 42-year interval. The oldest cohort was born in 1905 and 
the youngest cohort in 1975. The data include the starting and ending dates of all 
insured employment spells of all individuals in the sample. This allows us to 
create a sample of job spells that were ongoing in January 1st, 1963 or started 
sometime after that date and follow these spells until they end - even if the jobs 
last for several decades. For some cohorts this implies that we can observe all 
employment spells during the entire career and directly observe the completed 
durations of all employment spells.  
We start by taking snapshots of data at regular intervals and by computing the 
distribution of the elapsed duration of ongoing jobs at various points in time. 
Since we are using administrative data, many problems related to recall errors 
and consistency of measurement over time can be avoided. Also problems due to 
non-response or panel attrition do not arise with administrative records. To verify 
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that administrative data is consistent with typical survey data, we compare the 
results from administrative records to the data on tenure distribution in the Labor 
Force Survey. In Finland this can be done starting from 1982. We then proceed 
to the analysis of differences in elapsed tenure at a given age between successive 
cohorts. Though this approach is commonly used in analysing changes in job 
stability, we would argue that it is not a particularly appealing way of analysing 
the changes in job stability. To demonstrate this, we simulate the effects of 
changes in the entry rate of new jobs and the hazard of job ending this on 
commonly used measure for job stability.  
Since we have access to genuine panel data that for some cohorts cover the entire 
careers we can directly model the changes in the hazard of job ending. We do this 
using a competing risks model and analyse separately exits to other jobs and exits 
to non-employment. We are primarily interested in the variation of these hazards 
over time but also account for the effects of elapsed duration, age and gender on 
the hazard of job ending.  
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2. Data 
Our data are based on individual pension contribution records of workers covered 
by the Employee Pension Insurance Scheme. Data were originally collected for 
calculating pension accruals.  
The Finnish pension system is a defined-benefit system where each employment 
spell contributes to the old-age pension with a fixed accrual rate multiplied by the 
duration of the employment spell. Current system was created in 1962 and 
reformed in 2005. Pension contributions are mandatory and employers are liable 
for arranging pension insurance for all their employees. The system is operated 
by private insurance companies. When the workers retire the full pension is paid 
by the insurance company that had insured the last employment spell. The 
Finnish Centre for Pensions supervises the system and acts as a clearinghouse 
that allocates pension liabilities to the companies that received the pension 
contributions and transfers the funds to the company that will pay the pension to 
the retiree.  
To perform its task the Finnish Centre for Pensions has access to full pension 
contribution records of all pension insurance companies. Importantly for this 
study, these records include information on the starting and ending dates of all 
employment spells. The data set that is used for this study was created at the 
Finnish Centre for Pensions for developing indices that are used in converting the 
pension accruals to the price level prevailing at the time when the employees 
retire.  
The sampling frame includes all individuals who have contributed to the pension 
system between 1963 and 2004. The sampling was done using a stratified design 
first selecting those born on the eighth day of each month from every fifth cohort 
born between 1905 and 1975. Within each cohort individuals were then picked at 
random until a desired sample size was reached. For the individuals that are 
selected into the sample all employment spells between 1963 and 2004 are 
included in the data. Data contain cohort-specific sampling weights that are used 
throughout the paper. 
In the Finnish pension system employment spells contributed to the pensions 
from age 23 onwards. This age limit was reduced to 18 in 2005. For this reason 
the data from the earlier years only contain employment spells from age 23 
onwards. For the last three cohorts employment spells are recorded from age 18 
onwards. However, data contain the starting date of the employment spell also 
for the spells that were ongoing on the 23rd, and for the last cohorts, on the 18th 
birthday.  
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The first observations in the data are from 1963. Also in this case the data 
contain starting dates of all employment spells that were ongoing on January 1st 
1963 no matter when the job had started. Therefore, the sample is representative 
of all ongoing employment spells between 1963 and 2004 for the cohorts that are 
included in the sample. Naturally the follow-up period varies between cohorts. 
The oldest cohorts are only observed at the end of their careers and the youngest 
cohorts only at the beginning of their careers. The 1940 birth cohort is the only 
cohort that is observed from age 23 to age 64. The age range when each cohort is 
observed and the sample sizes available for each cohort are displayed in Table 1. 
Table 1  The observation period for each cohort in the original data set  
Birth cohort Years when Ages when   Sample size 
 observed observed Individuals Job spells 
1905 1963–1970 58–64 283 324 
1910 1963–1975 53–64 295 422 
1915 1963–1980 48–64 296 510 
1920 1963–1985 43–64 331 658 
1925 1963–1990 38–64 401 1,082 
1930 1963–1995 33–64 442 1,593 
1935 1963–2000 28–64 469 2,863 
1940 1963–2004 23–64 456 2,878 
1945 1968–2004 23–59 494 4,569 
1950 1973–2004 23–54 514 4,955 
1955 1978–2004 23–49 538 4,563 
1960 1983–2004 23–44 533 5,890 
1965 1983–2004 18–39 1,022 13,094 
1970 1988–2004 18–33 1,020 13,009 
1975 1993–2004 18–29 975 10,223 
 
The main limitations of the data are due to changes in the pension coverage over 
time. First, as already noted, the cohorts born before 1965 are only included in 
the data from their 23rd birthday. To keep the data consistent across cohorts, we 
have excluded all job spells ending before age 23 also for the younger cohorts. 
Second, the data excludes very short spells lasting for less than one month 
because these jobs were not insured under the Employees’ Pension Scheme 
(TEL). Before 1965 this limit was six months and between 1965 and 1971 four 
months. We have no data from jobs insured under Temporary Employees' 
Pension Act (LEL) that cover the employees in construction, agriculture, forestry 
and harbour work. The main reason for this is that LEL-insurance is based on 
monthly gross earnings and has no need to record employment dates.  
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Finally, the data covers both public and private sector workers but the coverage 
of the public sector is incomplete before the 1980s. To minimize the effect of 
changes in insurance coverage, we exclude all public sector employment spells 
from most empirical calculations. In the empirical analysis we also exclude self-
employed and farmers (both covered by their own pension schemes) and hence 
focus on the private sector employees covered by Employees Pension Scheme 
(TEL) for which we have information reported in a consistent way for the whole 
42-year-period. Our analysis sample covers most private sector workers. For 
example, in 2004 about 90 per cent of private sector employees paid 
contributions to the Employees Pension Scheme. 
In addition to dates of job spells the data contain only a limited amount of other 
information. Age and gender can be inferred from the id-codes. Reasons why job 
spells ended can be used to identify those who retire, but not to distinguish 
between dismissals and quits. As a partial solution we can classify jobs endings 
as quits and layoffs based on whether the employee started a new job within two 
weeks after the end of the previous job. 
Other than removing the public sector employees, we have made only minimal 
adjustments to the original data. We removed short overlapping job spells in 
cases when a short spell begins and ends while a longer spell is ongoing. Job 
spells that are ongoing on December 31st, 2004 or ongoing on the day when the 
worker turns 65 are marked as censored. Jobs that were ongoing in January 1963 
are also included in data and coded according to their original starting date. Data 
are left-truncated since we can only observe spells that lasted until 1963. Left-
truncation also arises because spells that end before the 23rd birthday as well as 
spells lasting for less than 6 months before 1965, less than 4 months before 1972 
and less than one month thereafter are not observed. 
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3. Comparison to other data sources 
Most commonly studies on job stability are based on consecutive cross-sectional 
surveys that have been widely available for research purposes. Several studies in 
the United States have used data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). It 
collects information on tenure with the current employer or in the current job in 
various mobility supplements conducted at irregular intervals since 1951.  
Comparable cross-sectional survey data have also been used in several other 
countries to measure the changes in job stability. Heisz (1999, 2005) used 
monthly tenure data collected in the Canadian Labor Force Survey (CLFS) since 
1976, Gregg and Wadsworth (1995, 2002) and Burgess and Rees (1996, 1997, 
1998) used data from the British Labor Force Survey (BLFS) and data from the 
General Household Survey (GHS). Both data sets include annual information on 
the current tenure of the respondents since 1975 and 1974, respectively. Vejsiu 
(2001) used data from the Swedish Level of Living Surveys and the Swedish 
Labor Force Survey. These two data sources contain information on the current 
tenure in ongoing jobs in Sweden from 1968 onwards. The Swiss Labor Force 
Survey used by Sousa-Poza (2004) has gathered information on the current 
tenure of the respondents since 1991.  
While independent cross-sectional surveys are designed to be representative for 
the target population in each cross-section, the fact that they lack information on 
eventual tenure after the interview date is unfortunate. CPS income supplements 
offer a slight improvement making it possible to follow respondents in two 
consecutive years (Stewart 2002). Similar two year panel has been available in 
the aforementioned Swiss Labor Force Survey. Nevertheless, the main approach 
employed in studies using CPS data and comparable sources from other countries 
has been to analyze the changes in the current tenure distribution (Farber 1995, 
1997, 2007; Jaeger & Stevens 2000) or to rely on strong assumptions that allow 
predicting future retention rates (Swinnerton & Wial 1995; Diepod, Neumark & 
Polsky 1997; Neumark, Polsky & Hansen 2000;) or eventual competed duration 
of the job held by the respondents (Hall 1982; Ureta 1992). 
Several studies have employed panel data to analyze the changes in job stability. 
In the United States, Marcotte (1999), Polsky (1999), Gottschalk and Moffit 
(2000) and Jaeger and Stevens (2000) all use the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID). Since 1976, the PSID has included a question on the current 
tenure, and in principle the annual interviews allow one to track employment 
histories of the survey respondents.  
Other panel data sets used in US studies on job stability include the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and the National Longitudinal Surveys 
(NLS). The SIPP data used by Gottschalk and Moffit (2000) and Bansak and 
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Raphael (2006) include information on the job histories of the individuals 
typically over a period lasting 32 months. The National Longitudinal Survey of 
Young Men and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, have been used for 
analyzing job stability by Bernhardt, Morris, Handcock and Scott (2000). These 
two data sets provide the researchers with a 16-year follow-up of the employment 
histories of young men starting from a cohort born in 1944, and include employer 
coding that captures job changes. 
The German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) was used by Winkelmann and 
Zimmermann (1998) and Bergemann and Mertens (2004). These data are 
available since 1984 and include information on both the current tenure of the 
individuals and their labor market transitions between consecutive interviews. In 
addition, when the GSOEP was initiated in 1984, the respondents were asked 
about the number of employers they had during the past 10 years. Even longer 
retrospective data is available in Britain. Booth, Francesconi and Garcia-Serrano 
(1999) use retrospective employment history data gathered in 1993 as a part of 
the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). This survey asked the respondents 
to list their employment history until September 1990 starting from the day they 
left full-time education. 
Naturally, the risk in using retrospective data for analyzing changes in job 
stability is that the respondents may not recall short employment spells in distant 
past which could lead to a false impression of declining job stability. A perhaps 
better alternative is to compare retrospective information in surveys conducted at 
different times. This approach was applied by Stevens (2005) who used data 
from the Retirement History Survey (RHS), the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Older Men (NLSOM) and the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) to measure 
changes in the distribution of the longest job held by the respondents during their 
career. 
Data from administrative registers has been used only recently for analyzing 
changes in job stability. For example, Bratberg, Salvanes and Vaage (2006) use 
linked employer-employee data from the period 1986-2002 to investigate the 
changes in job stability in Norway. Also Mahringer (2005a, 2005b) uses 
administrative employment spell data based on the Austrian social security 
records from 1975 onwards. These data sets, along with the pension register data 
employed in this paper, can be seen as considerable improvements to the job 
stability literature by making it relatively easy to follow job spells over time and 
by avoiding several problems researchers have previously faced with survey-
based data. 
 
 8 
 
4. Descriptive analysis 
Changes in average tenure over time 
As a first attempt to describe changes in job stability in our pension records data 
we examine the changes in the average tenure over time. We pick an arbitrary 
date, October 15th, each year and report the average elapsed duration of the jobs 
that were ongoing on that day. The results are plotted in Figure 1. We report both 
simple averages and regression adjusted averages that account for changes in the 
age and gender distribution. The horizontal line in the figure refers to the overall 
arithmetic average, 8.7 years. 
The unadjusted numbers are trending slightly upwards over time. This partly 
reflects population aging. Older workers have accumulated on average longer 
tenure, and an increase in their share in the data increases the average tenure. It is 
not clear whether any adjustments for population aging should be made; an 
increase in average tenure is a real phenomenon even if it is caused by a change 
in the age structure. However, our sample is not exactly representative of the 
current population in any single year; it is only representative for the certain 
cohorts. Since a new cohort is added to data every fifth year, the sample gets 
successively older for five years and then suddenly younger as a new cohort 
enters in the data. The effect of sampling scheme can be seen as a modest five-
year cycle in the unadjusted average tenure. The age effect is particularly strong 
in the end of the data. The youngest cohort born in 1975 is included in the data in 
1998, but after that no new cohorts enter and the sample gets gradually older. 
The largest changes in the adjusted average tenure series occur in the end of 
1970s when the average tenure increases and in the 1990s when average tenure 
starts a gradual decline.  
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Figure 1  Average tenure in current job 1963–2004 
Note: Adjusted series is created by regressing elapsed duration on gender and one-year age dummies and 
calculating the predicted values when gender and age distributions are set equal to the sample average. 
 
 
Comparison of register vs. survey data  
To verify that changes occurring in the register data are not due to changes in 
reporting procedures or changes in insurance coverage, we compared the tenure 
distribution in the register data to the figures calculated from the Labor Force 
Survey1. 
Comprehensive micro-level data from the Labor Force Survey are not available 
for research purposes in Finland. Therefore, we cannot calculate simple statistics 
such as the mean tenure for years before 1997. However, Statistics Finland 
regularly publishes monthly data on new jobs, defined as jobs with tenure less 
than a year. Statistics Finland also provided us with unpublished tabulations on 
the tenure distribution that allow calculating the fraction of jobs with current 
tenure of more than ten years in a consistent way. 
                                              
1 Questions on the current tenure were first added to the annual interview of the Labor Force Survey in 
the fall of 1982. The question on current tenure was included in the survey every year until 1987 and then 
and every other year between and 1987 and 1993. In 1995 and 1996, the tenure question was included in 
the EU Labor Force Survey conducted in spring. From 1997 onwards the question on elapsed tenure has 
been included in the monthly Labor Force Survey. In addition to changes in survey dates, also the survey 
question has been changed slightly which may make the LFS time-series less consistent over time. 
6
7
8
9
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1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Unadjusted Adjusted
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In Figure 2 we plot the fraction of workers with elapsed tenure over one year and 
in Figure 3 fraction of workers with elapsed tenure over ten years based on both 
the pension records and on the survey data. We have made the sources as 
comparable as possible. Since the annual interview of the LFS was held between 
September and December in the 1980s we use data from the last quarter of the 
year also after 1997. After 1980s the coverage of the register data is better so 
that, in contrast to the other analyses in this paper, also the public sector 
employees and workers under 23 can be included in this comparison. 
According to Figures 2 and 3 the evolution of the tenure distribution is very 
similar in the survey and register data. According to both sources, on average, 
about 80% of the workers have been in their jobs for more than a year. Also the 
changes in tenure distribution seem similar. According to both sources there was 
a large increase in the fraction of workers with more than one year of tenure in 
the beginning of 1990s. This does not imply that job markets were more stable 
during those years, rather the opposite. Finland experienced a major recession in 
the beginning of 1990s and very few workers were recruited during those years. 
Hence the fraction of new workers with short tenure declined and average tenure 
increased. 
Survey and register data seem to produce similar numbers also in Figure 3 that 
displays the fraction of workers with more than ten years of tenure. According to 
either source about 35 to 40% of workers have been working for their current 
employer for more than ten years. There is also a slight increase over time, again 
potentially explained by population aging. 
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Figure 2  Share of workers with elapsed tenure > 1 year in register vs. survey 
data  
 
Figure 3  Share of workers with elapsed tenure > 10 years in register vs. 
survey data  
Notes to Figures 2 and 3:  
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Elapsed tenure in register data is calculated based on jobs ongoing on October 15th each year. Data 
includes workers between 18 and 64 and cover both public and private sector employees. Self-employed 
are excluded. Survey data up to 1993 is based on annual interview of the Labor Force Survey. Data from 
1995 and 1996 are from EU Labor Force Survey. From 1997 onwards data is based on monthly Labor 
Force Survey. To avoid inconsistencies due to differences in survey dates we have used the numbers from 
the last quarter of each year. 
 
 
Differences across cohorts 
Examining changes in current tenure in a given year may not be the best way to 
capture long-term changes in job stability. Possibly a better approach is to 
compare differences in elapsed tenure at a given age between consecutive birth 
cohorts.  
In Figures 4a and 4b we follow the example by Farber (2007) and plot average 
elapsed tenure by age for different cohorts separately for men and women. For 
clarity we aggregate the cohort data slightly and take an average of three 
consecutive cohorts so that the first line refers to cohorts born between 1905 and 
1915 and the last line to cohorts born between 1965 and 1975. 
According to Figures 4a and 4b the average elapsed tenure increases almost 
linearly by age. The increase is more rapid for men. At age 50 the average tenure 
for men is about 15 years and average tenure for females about 12 years. 
Differences across cohorts are not very large except in the older ages where also 
the number of observations gets small and the estimates less precise. Still, one 
can note that the youngest cohorts born between 1965 and 1975 have 
accumulated slightly less tenure at any given age than the cohorts born before 
1965.  
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Figure 4a Mean elapsed tenure by age and cohort, men 
 
Figure 4b  Mean elapsed tenure by age and cohort, women 
 
The differences across cohorts can be seen more clearly from Figure 5 that 
presents the cohort effects from a regression model where (log) current tenure is 
explained by a set of cohort dummies and a full set of one-year age dummies. 
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The figure shows that, conditional on age, average tenure was lower in the first 
female cohorts but then remained rather stable for both men and women until the 
cohorts born in 1950s. For both men and women age adjusted average elapsed 
tenure is smallest among the youngest cohorts.   
 
 
Figure 5  Cohort effects on current tenure 
 
It should be noted that the decrease in the average age-adjusted tenure does not 
necessarily imply that the jobs held by the youngest cohorts would be less stable 
but also reflects a delay in the age of entry into the labor market due to an 
increase in time spent in education. Figure 6 displays the labor force participation 
rate and the employment rate in age group between 15 and 24. Both fluctuate 
according to the business cycle but have also declined substantially over time. 
The labor force participation rate in this age group is about ten percentage points 
lower and the employment rate about twenty percentage points lower in 2004 
than in 1970. 
-.8
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1905 1915 1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975
Men Women
 15 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Employment rate (old series)
Employment rate (new series)
Labor Force Participation Rate (old series)
Labor Force Participation Rate (new series)
 
Figure 6 Labor force participation rate and employment rate in ages 15–24 
Data source: Labor Force Survey, Statistics Finland database. Break in series is due to the reform in the 
Survey. 
 
 16 
 
5. Effects of the changes in entry rates and the risk of 
job loss on average tenure 
Though commonly used, the change in mean elapsed duration of ongoing 
employment spells may not be a particularly informative statistic for measuring 
the changes in job stability. To illustrate this we simulate the dynamic effects of 
changes in job stability defined as the change in the risk of job ending on average 
tenure.  
We follow Lancaster (1990) and start by noting that the number of persons 
employed at time t0 is  
 
0
)()( dyySyn y ,    (1) 
 
which depends on the number of entrants y periods ago n(-y) and their historical 
y-period survival rates S-y(y). Hence, the mean elapsed duration of ongoing spells 
at time t0 is 
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In general, the expression (2) depends on all past entry rates and all past survival 
rates. For example Ureta (1992) notes that calculating average completed tenure 
based on survival rates calculated from a cross-section data as was done in the 
famous paper by Hall (1982) leads to a bias if the arrival rates are not constant. 
Ureta’s example of non-constant arrival rates had to do with increased labor force 
participation rates by women. Similar effects could be caused by large scale 
changes in immigration, changes in school-leaving age or major swings in the 
business cycle. 
However, even if the entry rates were constant, the mean elapsed duration of 
ongoing jobs depends on all past survival rates and not only on the recent 
changes that a measure of changes in job stability should capture. Hence, for 
example a major recession that causes a temporary shock to the job exit rates 
affects average tenure long after the recession has ended. 
In Figure 7a we illustrate the effect of an increase in the labor market entry rate 
on the average duration of ongoing jobs. We start from a stationary state where 
the number of new entrants is constant and equals the labor market exit rate. We 
estimate a Kaplan-Meyer survival function from our pension record data and use 
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expression 5 to calculate average duration of ongoing jobs. To simplify 
calculations, we assume that there is no unemployment so that the workers whose 
contracts end immediately find a new job where their tenure is naturally initially 
zero. 
We then increase the entry rate with a constant number of new entrants each year 
so that total employment increases by 20 per cent in 20 years and remains 
constant thereafter. We use equation (2) to calculate average tenure in ongoing 
jobs each year from t = 0 to t = 100. According to the results presented in Figure 
7a the increase in labor market entry decreases the average tenure because there 
are more recent entrants with short tenure. Interestingly the effect of an increase 
in the entry rate has a long-lasting effect. Even at time t = 30 the average tenure 
is substantially below the initial level even though the increase in the entry rate 
had ceased ten years ago. The average tenure stabilizes to the initial level after 
about forty years. 
A researcher comparing average tenure generated by our simulation between, for 
example, years t = 0 and t = 30 might well conclude that average tenure has 
declined and jobs become less stable. The conclusion would be quite misleading. 
The survival function of new jobs, and hence the average eventual completed 
tenure, is constant in our simulations. The decrease in average elapsed tenure in a 
cross-section is entirely due to an increase in the number of recent entrants.  
7
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Figure 7a  Simulation results: Effect of an increase in entry rate on average 
tenure 
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In Figure 7b we present results from another simulation more closely related to 
changes in job stability. We keep the number of new entrants constant but 
simulate the effects of a temporary increase in the hazard of job ending. We start 
again with survival function estimated from our pension records data but increase 
the hazard of job loss by 50 percent for five years for all cohorts that are in the 
labor market between years t = 0 and t = 5. After five years we return the hazard 
rate to its initial level. Average elapsed tenure is again calculated based on 
equation (2) for time periods from t = 0 to t = 100. 
As shown in Figure 7b the increase in the hazard of job ending decreases the 
average tenure. Note that this is partly due to our simplifying assumption 
according to which the workers who lose their jobs are immediately re-employed 
(with zero tenure). This would also imply that hiring rate would have to increase. 
If an increase in the job ending rate led to an increase in unemployment, the 
change in average tenure would depend on the changes in re-employment rates. 
In a typical recession the re-employment rate decreases and leads to an increase 
in average tenure (Burgess and Rees 1996). The number of new (low tenure) jobs 
typically starts to increase only when recession is over. It is therefore better to 
interpret our simulation as an impact of temporarily higher volatility rather than 
as an effect of recession. 
The most interesting feature of simulation results presented in Figure 7b is that a 
temporary increase in volatility has long-lasting effects on average tenure. Even 
though the shock to the job ending rates only lasts for five years the average 
tenure is substantially below the initial level several decades afterwards. Again 
data on the mean elapsed duration of ongoing jobs in consecutive cross-sections 
would give a misleading picture on the changes in uncertainty. 
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Figure 7b  Simulation results: Effect of an increase in the hazard of job ending 
on average tenure 
 
 20 
 
6. Changes in the risk of job loss – Results from a 
duration model 
The most natural measure of labor market uncertainty is probably the risk that a 
job ends. A standard way of modeling this risk is the conditional probability that 
a job ends given that it has lasted for a given time, i.e. the hazard rate. Modeling 
the effects of exogenous covariates on the hazard rate - instead of on e.g. the 
completed duration of a job - also provides a simple ways to account for 
censoring due to a finite observation period, duration dependence, and the effects 
of covariates that vary over time.  
Our data is a sample of jobs ongoing on January 1st 1963 and of jobs beginning 
between 1963 and 2004. It is therefore a mixture of stock and flow samples. Jobs 
that began before 1963 are observed only if they are still ongoing in 1963 
creating a left-truncated sample. Left truncation arises also because we observe 
only employment spells ongoing after the 23rd birthday, and because jobs lasting 
less than 6 months until 1965, 4 months until 1972 and a month thereafter are not 
included in the data. The starting date is known also for the stock-sampled jobs. 
The ending dates of jobs that are still ongoing in the end of 2004 are unknown, 
and the data is hence right-censored at this point. We also censor jobs on the 65th 
birthday as workers over 65 are no longer paying pension contributions and are 
thus not followed in the data. 
To model the changes in the hazard of job ending we use a competing risks 
model with two possible destinations: non-employment and a new job. Our 
definition is based on whether we observe a new employment spell within two 
weeks after the previous spell ends. We also experimented with a time limit of 
four weeks for this definition, but this had practically no effect on the results. 
A large number of jobs end soon after they begin. After a job has lasted for a 
year, the hazard of job loss declines to about a fifth of the hazard prevailing 
during the first four months. The decline in the hazard of job change decreases 
also though the decline is smaller. To allow flexible forms of duration 
dependence in both hazards we specify a piecewise constant baseline hazard 
function where the hazard stays constant for four month periods during the first 
year and for one year periods thereafter. 
We explain the changes in the hazard rates by gender, age and time. Again we 
aim to maximum flexibility and include the time varying covariates as a set of 
one-year age and time dummies. We assume that the covariates have proportional 
effects on the hazard rates. We also assume that there are no interactions so that, 
for example, duration dependence is independent of age. While these 
assumptions might be questioned, we would argue that they have little impact on 
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our primary objective; consistent estimation of the time effects that capture the 
changes in the hazard of job ending over time.  
We account for individual-specific unobserved heterogeneity by specifying a 
mixed proportional hazard model with three discrete points of support following 
the approach by Heckman & Singer (1984). The choice of the number of support 
points is somewhat arbitrary, but experimentation with different numbers of 
discrete points revealed that the other parameter estimates remained practically 
unchanged with two, three, or four mass points . However, imposing a restriction 
that there is no unobserved heterogeneity would have substantial effects on the 
estimates.  
We use the partial likelihood method (Lancaster 1979) that makes accounting for 
left truncation relatively easy. Jobs that are ongoing at the start of the observation 
period contribute to the hazard estimates only from the entry date onwards. The 
jobs that end within the observation period contribute to the likelihood function 
through both the hazard and the survival function, but the jobs that are still 
ongoing at the end of the observation period contribute only through the survival 
function.  
Our model specification can be formalized as follows. We define the hazard 
function related to destination s  for job j  of individual i  conditional on the 
vectors of observed covariates ijx  and individual-specific unobserved 
heterogeneity terms  21 , iii    as 
     issijijsiijijs xxpetxth  ,    (3) 
 
We specify the baseline hazard function  ijs t  for destination s  as 
   

 
K
k
ddtskijs kkij
It
1
,1
     (4) 
 
where I  is an indicator function splitting each job spell into K episodes. 
Furthermore, the survival function related to destination s  for job j  of individual 
i  given the vectors of observed covariates ijx  and individual-specific unobserved 
heterogeneity terms i  is defined as 
   



 
ijt
iijsiijijs duxuhxpextS
0
,,  .   (5) 
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Let   denote the parameter vector to be estimated and iw  the sampling weight of 
individual i . In addition, let ijsc  denote a dummy variable indicating whether job 
j  of individual i  is censored. The pseudo log-likelihood function can now be 
written as 
           





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N
i m
J
j s mijijs
mijijs
c
mijijs
mi
i
ijs
xeS
xtSxth
oglwLogl
1
3
1 1
2
1
1
,
,,

 , (6) 
 
where the term between the brackets is the marginal likelihood contribution of 
individual i . The parameters m  and m  denote the mass point vectors and 
corresponding probabilities of the unobserved heterogeneity distribution that are 
estimated along with the other parameters of the model.  
We parametrize the probabilities m of the unobserved heterogeneity distribution 
as 
 
 

 M
m
m
m
m
p
p
1'
'exp
exp     (7) 
 
and normalize 1p  to zero. This parametrization takes automatically care of the 
requirement that the estimated probabilities must lie between zero and one. 
The role of the division by  mijijs xeS ,  in the pseudo log-likelihood function is 
to take into account the left truncation in our data. That is, we condition the 
likelihood contribution of each job on the fact that it must have survived until ije  
which denotes the elapsed duration at which job j  of individual i  enters the 
data. 
Our approach produces a large number of parameters. For expositional reasons 
we prefer presenting the estimated hazard ratios and their 95% confidence 
intervals in a graphical way. The parameter estimates and their standard errors 
are reported in the appendix. We start by plotting the baseline hazard function in 
Figure 8a. We omit the first category with elapsed duration of 0-4 moths. As 
shown in the figure the hazard of job loss declines rapidly during the first few 
years. After having lasted for seven years the hazard is about 10 per cent of the 
hazard during the first four months. After that the hazard of job loss remains 
approximately constant for twenty years. The hazard of job change declines also, 
but the decline is clearly slower. At very high durations the estimates of job 
change hazard get less precise due to a small number of job changes. 
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Figure 8a  Hazard of job ending as a function of elapsed duration 
 
Figure 8b presents the effect of age on the hazard rates. We have chosen age 23 
as the reference category and omit ages 63 and 64 from the figure for 
expositional reasons. The risk of job loss first declines as the workers get older. 
From about age 52 onwards the hazard increases rapidly with age reflecting the 
effect of early retirement and gets very high after age 60. Hazard of job change 
declines almost linearly as the workers get older. 
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Figure 8b  The effect of age on the hazad of job loss 
 
Finally in Figure 8c we plot the time effects using 1963 as a reference period. We 
find that the hazard of job change is much more volatile than the hazard of job 
loss. Early 1970s, late 1980s and late 1990s were years of particularly rapid job-
to-job mobility. In contrast, there is only one peak in the hazard to non-
employment that coincides with the recession in the early 1990s. If we interprete 
the hazard to non-employment as an indicator of uncertainty, we can also note 
that the uncertainty after year 2000 is approximately at the same level as it was 
forty years earlier, in the beginning of the 1960s.  
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Figure 8c  Time variation in the job termination hazard 
 
A comparison of the job-to-job and job-to-non employment hazards to the mean 
elapsed duration of ongoing jobs presented in Figure 1 reveals that these series 
appear to be almost unrelated to each other. The increase in average tenure 
observed around 1980 could be partially explained by lower job-to-job mobility 
in the end of the 1970s and the decrease in average tenure after 1993 by an 
increase in job-to-job mobility in mid 1990s, but clearly something else is going 
on also. In addition, two possible measures of job security: mean elapsed 
duration of ongoing jobs and hazard of job ending point to very different time 
pattern in the changes of uncertainty prevailing in the labor market.  
As we noted in the previous chapter, the mean elapsed duration of ongoing jobs 
depends not only on the current hazard of job ending, but also on past hazards 
and the variation in entry rates. To quantify these effects we used the estimates 
from a slighlty simplified version of our duration model2 together with the 
number of new entrants each year and the initial duration distribution that 
prevailed in 1963 to simulate the average tenure in each year.  
As shown in Figure 9 the simulated average tenure correspond relatively well to 
the observed average tenure in any given year. Only major deviation between the 
observed and the simulated series occurs in the end of the series, and this can be 
                                              
2 The model used for the simulation exercise includes only duration dependence and year effects with no 
unobserved heterogeneity.  
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explained by the changes in the age distribution of our sample. To quantify the 
effects of changes in job ending hazards on average tenure, we then restricted 
both the job-to-job and job-to-non employment hazards at their sample averages 
and simulated again the implied mean elapsed tenure for each year. As shown in 
Figure 9 this has surprisingly little effect on the time pattern of the average 
tenure. However, if we also restrict the number of new entrants to a constant the 
pattern is very different irrespective of whether we keep the hazard rates constant 
or not. Note that even if both the entry rate and the hazard rates are constant, 
average elapsed duration generally changes over time since there is no reason to 
assume that the tenure distribution in 1963 reflected a steady state. In fact, the 
mean elapsed duration of ongoing jobs in 1963 was rather low, possibly due to 
earlier labor supply shocks. 
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Figure 9  Simulation results 
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7. Lifetime jobs 
For the cohorts that have retired by the year 2004 we can directly observe the 
duration distribution for the longest job over the career. In Figure 10 we present 
the average length of the longest job during the career for cohorts born in 1940 or 
before. For the cohorts for which we observe almost the entire career this can be 
done accurately. For the two oldest cohorts that are under observation from ages 
53 or 58 onwards we can be less certain that the job we observe in the end of the 
career is the longest job the individual has held over lifetime. To make the data 
more consistent between cohorts we restrict the data to those who were employed 
at some point after age 50.  
According to Figure 10 the average length of the longest job over lifetime in 
these cohorts was around 22 years for men and a few years shorter for women. 
For men the average length has been very similar across cohorts born between 
1905 and 1940. For women there is a clear upward trend with the 1940 cohort 
reaching almost the same length as men. We have also calculated various 
quantiles of this distribution. For example the median durations are very close to 
the mean durations, both in terms of the level and changes.  
Our results reveal that, at least for the cohorts that have already retired, long-term 
employment contracts were an important feature of the labor market. Also no 
indications that lifetime contracts had become less common can be seen in the 
data. Rather the long-term contracts seem to have gotten more common, at least 
for women, perhaps reflecting their increased participation into the labor market. 
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Figure 10  Average length of longest job during the career 
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8. Conclusions 
The estimates presented in this paper suggest that there has been no long-term 
trend in the mean elapsed duration of ongoing jobs in Finland. Average tenure 
has still varied considerably over time, but this variation has been mainly due to 
the variation in the number of new entrants into the labor market. If we instead 
measure job market stability by the hazard of job loss - or more precisely by the 
hazard of job ending that leads into non-employment - using a standard duration 
model specification, we find that job stability declined during a major recession 
but that the risk of job loss after year 2000 is at the level observed forty years 
ago. 
Our results suggest that there are important caveats to be kept in mind when 
using the elapsed duration of ongoing jobs to measure changes in job stability. 
The changes in average tenure appear to be mainly related to the changes in the 
number of new jobs rather than changes in stability of existing jobs. 
This paper also illustrates the benefits of using register data originally collected 
for administrative purposes. Pension registers are particularly useful since 
calculating pensions typically requires information from the entire careers. 
Compared with previous research on job stability we can both cover much longer 
period starting from early 1960s to present and observe the entire lifetime job 
histories. The Finnish data is of unusual quality because of centrally coordinated 
pension system that requires information on dates of employment contracts. Still 
similar data probably exists with pension authorities also in other countries. 
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Appendix 
Parameter Estimates for the Mixed Proportional Hazard Competing Risks 
Model of Job Endings 
  To Non-Employment   To a New Job 
  Estimate SE P-value  Estimate SE P-value 
Constant 1.626 0.147 0.000  -0.938 0.203 0.000 
Male -0.195 0.033 0.000  -0.023 0.035 0.258 
Duration depencence (reference category 0) 
4 months -0.534 0.037 0.000  -0.242 0.057 0.000 
8 months -0.995 0.043 0.000  -0.303 0.063 0.000 
1 year -1.482 0.042 0.000  -0.697 0.057 0.000 
2 years -1.848 0.051 0.000  -0.927 0.065 0.000 
3 years -2.002 0.057 0.000  -1.094 0.073 0.000 
4 years -2.291 0.069 0.000  -1.234 0.082 0.000 
5 years -2.268 0.073 0.000  -1.462 0.092 0.000 
6 years -2.385 0.079 0.000  -1.532 0.099 0.000 
7 years -2.567 0.091 0.000  -1.631 0.108 0.000 
8 years -2.620 0.097 0.000  -2.038 0.135 0.000 
9 years -2.591 0.104 0.000  -1.892 0.136 0.000 
10 years -2.613 0.109 0.000  -1.525 0.125 0.000 
11 years -2.646 0.125 0.000  -2.012 0.162 0.000 
12 years -2.646 0.120 0.000  -2.424 0.199 0.000 
13 years -2.664 0.127 0.000  -2.108 0.179 0.000 
14 years -2.742 0.135 0.000  -2.203 0.195 0.000 
15 years -2.570 0.131 0.000  -2.208 0.219 0.000 
16 years -2.799 0.151 0.000  -2.182 0.205 0.000 
17 years -2.673 0.139 0.000  -2.508 0.266 0.000 
18 years -2.743 0.159 0.000  -3.313 0.423 0.000 
19 years -2.778 0.167 0.000  -2.836 0.348 0.000 
20 years -2.647 0.160 0.000  -2.598 0.314 0.000 
21 years -2.794 0.172 0.000  -4.132 0.618 0.000 
22 years -2.618 0.167 0.000  -2.695 0.374 0.000 
23 years -2.544 0.164 0.000  -3.104 0.477 0.000 
24 years -2.711 0.195 0.000  -3.147 0.517 0.000 
25 years -2.522 0.171 0.000  -2.625 0.393 0.000 
26 years -2.556 0.188 0.000  -2.905 0.515 0.000 
27 years -2.379 0.175 0.000  -3.975 1.002 0.000 
28 years -2.830 0.228 0.000  -2.901 0.474 0.000 
29 years -2.484 0.201 0.000  -11.314 0.096 0.000 
30 years -2.209 0.106 0.000  -2.857 0.271 0.000 
Year effects (reference category 1963) 
1964 0.022 0.111 0.421  0.115 0.178 0.259 
1965 0.066 0.109 0.273  -0.121 0.187 0.258 
1966 -0.025 0.114 0.415  0.189 0.178 0.144 
1967 -0.161 0.118 0.085  -0.367 0.198 0.032 
1968 -0.112 0.110 0.153  -0.079 0.182 0.332 
1969 -0.271 0.117 0.010  0.047 0.176 0.395 
1970 -0.199 0.117 0.044  0.091 0.174 0.300 
1971 -0.307 0.124 0.007  0.158 0.173 0.179 
1972 -0.256 0.108 0.009  0.526 0.152 0.000 
1973 -0.085 0.096 0.186  0.311 0.148 0.018 
1974 -0.225 0.103 0.014  0.480 0.144 0.000 
1975 -0.329 0.109 0.001  0.011 0.165 0.473 
1976 -0.152 0.113 0.090  -0.035 0.167 0.416 
1977 -0.118 0.111 0.145  -0.275 0.190 0.074 
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1978 -0.103 0.107 0.168  0.079 0.157 0.306 
1979 -0.128 0.106 0.115  0.252 0.156 0.053 
1980 -0.161 0.112 0.075  0.191 0.163 0.121 
1981 -0.130 0.114 0.127  0.219 0.169 0.098 
1982 0.043 0.106 0.342  0.229 0.165 0.083 
1983 0.084 0.100 0.202  0.398 0.151 0.004 
1984 0.005 0.103 0.482  0.494 0.148 0.000 
1985 -0.061 0.109 0.286  0.445 0.158 0.002 
1986 0.047 0.110 0.335  0.380 0.159 0.008 
1987 0.086 0.111 0.219  0.590 0.155 0.000 
1988 0.029 0.098 0.384  0.710 0.139 0.000 
1989 -0.035 0.100 0.363  0.718 0.141 0.000 
1990 0.117 0.103 0.128  0.323 0.154 0.018 
1991 0.229 0.110 0.018  -0.071 0.173 0.341 
1992 0.590 0.102 0.000  -0.147 0.181 0.207 
1993 0.593 0.095 0.000  -0.110 0.165 0.253 
1994 0.188 0.099 0.030  0.131 0.156 0.201 
1995 0.283 0.103 0.003  0.084 0.157 0.296 
1996 0.187 0.105 0.038  0.110 0.156 0.242 
1997 0.048 0.101 0.317  0.503 0.149 0.000 
1998 0.105 0.094 0.131  0.418 0.137 0.001 
1999 0.024 0.098 0.404  0.339 0.142 0.008 
2000 -0.077 0.099 0.220  0.373 0.145 0.005 
2001 -0.104 0.105 0.162  0.308 0.150 0.020 
2002 -0.018 0.100 0.429  0.259 0.147 0.039 
2003 0.000 0.099 0.498  0.219 0.145 0.065 
2004 -0.073 0.115 0.264  0.309 0.166 0.031 
Age effects (reference category 23) 
24 0.024 0.057 0.334  -0.029 0.086 0.367 
25 -0.162 0.066 0.007  0.118 0.097 0.111 
26 -0.213 0.068 0.001  -0.100 0.104 0.169 
27 -0.345 0.063 0.000  -0.210 0.088 0.009 
28 -0.476 0.063 0.000  -0.126 0.081 0.061 
29 -0.368 0.070 0.000  -0.175 0.093 0.030 
30 -0.494 0.081 0.000  -0.081 0.106 0.220 
31 -0.563 0.084 0.000  -0.191 0.110 0.042 
32 -0.585 0.075 0.000  -0.150 0.096 0.060 
33 -0.564 0.070 0.000  -0.200 0.093 0.016 
34 -0.552 0.082 0.000  -0.106 0.101 0.148 
35 -0.593 0.089 0.000  -0.196 0.116 0.045 
36 -0.526 0.086 0.000  -0.413 0.126 0.001 
37 -0.584 0.082 0.000  -0.230 0.114 0.022 
38 -0.599 0.081 0.000  -0.414 0.110 0.000 
39 -0.488 0.085 0.000  -0.302 0.117 0.005 
40 -0.618 0.095 0.000  -0.300 0.128 0.010 
41 -0.604 0.098 0.000  -0.345 0.135 0.005 
42 -0.694 0.094 0.000  -0.307 0.122 0.006 
43 -0.609 0.089 0.000  -0.312 0.113 0.003 
44 -0.710 0.104 0.000  -0.381 0.142 0.004 
45 -0.523 0.105 0.000  -0.456 0.157 0.002 
46 -0.507 0.104 0.000  -0.476 0.164 0.002 
47 -0.650 0.101 0.000  -0.463 0.143 0.001 
48 -0.649 0.100 0.000  -0.489 0.150 0.001 
49 -0.632 0.109 0.000  -0.649 0.168 0.000 
50 -0.552 0.107 0.000  -0.782 0.190 0.000 
51 -0.527 0.110 0.000  -0.982 0.221 0.000 
52 -0.358 0.100 0.000  -0.783 0.185 0.000 
53 -0.373 0.099 0.000  -0.666 0.194 0.000 
54 0.031 0.105 0.384  -0.842 0.198 0.000 
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55 0.066 0.106 0.267  -0.891 0.221 0.000 
56 0.131 0.112 0.122  -0.760 0.236 0.001 
57 -0.047 0.108 0.334  -0.903 0.237 0.000 
58 0.166 0.107 0.060  -0.849 0.250 0.000 
59 0.631 0.109 0.000  -1.015 0.301 0.000 
60 0.495 0.120 0.000  -1.001 0.373 0.004 
61 0.718 0.123 0.000  -0.550 0.313 0.039 
62 0.803 0.122 0.000  -1.025 0.369 0.003 
63 0.859 0.124 0.000  -1.177 0.429 0.003 
64 2.394 0.106 0.000  -1.437 0.715 0.022 
Unobserved heterogeneity 
m2 -0.330 0.215 0.062  -1.915 0.139 0.000 
m3 -1.034 0.171 0.000  -1.016 0.074 0.000 
p2 1.737 0.413 0.000     
p3 1.465 0.275 0.000         
Pseudo log-likelihood   -4385653 
        
Notes: Maximum likelihood estimates using sampling weights. Standard errors based on Huber-White sandwhich estimator. 
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